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A Renaissance of Political Culture?* 
Robert W. Jackman, University of California, Davis 
Ross A. Miller, Santa Clara University 
Theory: Cultural differences drive significant elements of political and economic 
life. 
Hypotheses: (1) effective govemance hinges critically on traditions ofcivic engage- 
ment; (2) political culture fundamentally drives economic performance and demo- 
cratic stability. 
Method: Reanalysis of two data sets: (1) the first includes information collected 
by Putnam (1993) on a variety of political, economic and social indicators for the 
20 Italian regions; (2) the second includes comparable information collected by 
Inglehart (1990) for the industrial democracies. 
Results: We find little vidence to indicate a systematic relationship between politi- 
cal culture and political and economic performance. 
Ever since Max Weber, many social scientists looked at the 'right' cultural 
attitudes and beliefs as necessary conditions ('prerequisites') for economic 
progress, just as earlier theories had emphasized race, climate, or the pres- 
ence of natural resources. In the 1950s, newly fashioned cultural theories 
of development competed strongly with the economic ones (which stressed 
capital formation), with Weber's Protestant Ethic being modernized into 
David McClelland's 'achievement motivation' as a precondition of prog- 
ress and into Edward C. Banfield's 'amoral familism' as an obstacle. Ac- 
cording to my way of thinking, the very attitudes alleged to be preconditions 
of industrialization could be generated on the job and 'on the way,' by 
certain characteristics of the industrialization process. (Hirschman 1984, 
99) 
The belief that cultural differences underlie many of the observed varia- 
tions across political units has a long pedigree, especially among students 
of comparative politics. The classic exemplar of the argument remains Max 
Weber's analysis of linkages between the Protestant Ethic and the rise of 
capitalism in Europe ([1905] 1958). A benchmark study of the behavioral 
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revolution i  the study of politics is Almond and Verba's (1963) explora- 
tion of linkages between civic cultures and democracy across five societies. 
While the popularity of this general perspective has waxed and waned 
over the past three decades (e.g., the essays in Almond and Verba 1980; 
Barry 1970, especially chaps. 3, 4), the presumption that cultural differ- 
ences drive significant elements of political and economic life enjoys awide 
currency. Two major recent studies are especially noteworthy, because they 
are intended as part of a "renaissance" of political culture, to use Ingle- 
hart's (1988) term. The newest, Making Democracy Work (Putnam 1993), 
compares regional governments incontemporary Italy and contends that 
effective governance hinges critically on traditions ofcivic engagement. In
so doing, it parallels Culture Shift (Inglehart 1990), which, after examining 
a number of industrial societies, concludes that political culture fundamen- 
tally drives economic performance and democratic stability. 
Such arguments are of more than academic interest. For example, it is 
often asserted that democratization will continue to face severe handicaps 
in the southern European cone, much of Latin America, and most strikingly 
in East Europe and Russia, given the strong legacy of authoritarianism in 
the recent past. These claims, moreover, have already received a good deal 
of attention. According to The Economist, for example, Putnam (1993) is 
"a great work of social science, worthy to rank alongside de Tocqueville, 
Pareto, and Weber" (The Economist 1993, 96), while Laitin judges Put- 
nam' s book to be a "stunning breakthrough in political culture research" 
(1995, 171). 
Our purpose is to assess the broad elements of the cultural interpreta- 
tion. We first outline the distinctive attributes ofthis explanation and then 
evaluate the data offered by Putnam and Inglehart in light of those same 
attributes.) Towhat extent does the available vidence point o well-defined 
and enduring types of political cultures? Are there any systematic linkages 
between political culture and other outcomes? As will become clear, our 
results indicate that the cultural accounts of political ife are substantially 
overstated. Taking these results in conjunction with other evidence, we con- 
clude by suggesting that the political culture approach needs to be recast 
in institutional terms that more directly acknowledge the role of political 
considerations inexplaining performance. 
The Distinctive Elements of the Political Culture Approach 
Early studies of political culture frequently offered a unique exegesis 
of political behavior within a given state, often cast in terms of national 
'An earlier version of Putnam's analysis of the Italian material appears in Putnam, et 
al (1983), and a parallel analysis of the United States is summarized in Putnam (1995). 
We focus on the core issues Inglehart (1990) addresses in his Chapter 1 ("Culture, Stable 
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character. The notable xception, of course, was Weber's effort to identify 
the peculiar characteristics of Protestantism that might account for the asso- 
ciation he observed between the relative size of the Protestant population in 
various areas of Europe and the economic growth those areas experienced. 
Weber's answer emphasized the challenge to Medieval discipline repre- 
sented by Protestantism, along with distinctive alues associated with Prot- 
estantism that he believed fostered entrepreneurial skills.2 
In an analogous manner, Almond and Verba (1963) sought o identify 
the features of political culture that foster democratic performance. They 
paid special attention to the contrast between participant and subject cul- 
tures, arguing that democratic outcomes are more likely where participatory 
norms are widespread, and less likely where values take a predominantly 
passive, subject form. At about the same time, McClelland (1961, 1963) 
suggested that high concentrations of values emphasizing need for achieve- 
ment are the engine that drives economic growth. Since need for achieve- 
ment is a syndrome that emphasizes entrepreneurial skills, the parallels with 
Weber are direct. McClelland further suggested that authoritarian regimes 
were the likely outcome of cultures that stressed high levels of need for 
power and low levels of need for affiliation. Banfield (1958, 85) made the 
similar argument that economic and political "backwardness" isa function 
of high levels of amoral familism according to which the norm is to "max- 
imize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that 
all others will do likewise." Thus defined, amoral familism resembles both 
Almond and Verba's subject culture and McClelland's views on low levels 
of need for achievement. These concerns are echoed in the more recent 
analyses. For example, Putnam's (1993) emphasis on sense of civic com- 
munity matches Almond and Verba's case for the importance of a civic 
political culture: "Citizens in a civic community, though not selfless aints, 
regard the public domain as more than abattle-ground for pursuing personal 
interest" (Putnam 1993, 88). 
In contrast with the early national character studies that stressed the 
uniqueness of different political systems, then, cultures are taken to reflect 
Democracy, and Economic Development"), because these are the concerns that frame and 
justify his subsequent analyses. He addressed the same material in Inglehart (1988). 
2But religious control hardly evaporated with the Reformation, as was underscored by 
the theocracies a sociated with Calvin in Geneva nd Cromwell in the Republic of the Saints. 
Despite Weber, doctrinal issues may indeed have been less central to the Reformation than 
strategic and fiscal concerns (Manchester 1993). Indeed, as De Long has pointed out, "Prot- 
estantism" is correlated with other factors like early specialization i  manufacturing a d a 
high investment ratio. Thus, for the now wealthy states of Western Europe, their eligious 
tradition has been "a surprisingly good proxy for the social capability to assimilate modem 
technology" (De Long 1988, 1148). 
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relatively coherent clusters of attitudes. For some analysts, the syndrome 
involves the prevalence of entrepreneurial sentiments (as in need for 
achievement), while for others it is said to reveal a sense of civic commu- 
nity or civic virtue (as in Banfield, Almond and Verba, Inglehart, and Put- 
nam). The important point, however, is that the syndrome is coherent. 
A second point follows immediately: arguments about political culture 
are fundamentally concerned with the prevalence of such value clusters 
within societies. While the cultural pattern reflects he attitudes of individu- 
als, it assumes political and social significance tothe extent hat it is widely 
shared across individuals. At their heart, cultural arguments are thus con- 
cerned with aggregate properties ofsocieties. By Weber's original account, 
for example, it was the widespread iffusion of entrepreneurial attitudes 
fostered by Protestantism that gave rise to economic growth. 
Third, these cultural syndromes are durable. Even if slightly modified 
by short-term forces, their fundamental effects persist over the long haul. 
Such was clearly the pattern described by Weber, and Putnam (1993) traces 
the recent success of Italian regional governments to legacies of civic en- 
gagement reaching back to the Middle Ages. The point is also stressed in 
Inglehart's (1990, 422) suggestion that "People live in the past much more 
than they realize." In other words, the impact of direct experience on be- 
havior is severely constrained by norms passed across generations through 
early socialization (see also, Verba 1965, 554; Moore 1966, 485). Cultural 
factors thus condition how individuals adapt to changes in incentive struc- 
tures embodied in institutions, which distinguishes the perspective from 
social choice arguments, as Inglehart and others have pointed out.3 
Fourth, the significance of these enduring cultural syndromes stems 
from the way in which they drive other outcomes. Thus, Weber's analysis 
continues to attract attention because of the effects on economic growth 
he attributed toProtestantism, and it is hard to imagine this continuing 
attention without that imputation. Weber was, of course, quite explicit on 
the point. His fundamental goal was to undermine any form of "economic 
determinism" by showing that values are not epiphenomenal, Marx to the 
contrary (see on this point, e.g., Zeitlin 1990). Banfield (1958) was equally 
specific: Why was Montegrano s backward? Because amoral familism was 
endemic. In a parallel manner, Putnam argues against any "simple eco- 
nomic determinism" (1993, 152), insisting instead that cultural norms as 
reflected in a sense of civic community are responsible for both economic 
and political performance (1993, 98-9; see also Inglehart 1990, chap. 8). 
3This is the case even though Inglehart isincorrect when he suggests that social-choice 
arguments are concerned solely with the maximization ofeconomic utility. On this point, 
see Riker (1990), Aldrich (1993), Jackman (1993), and Poundstone (1993, 51-2). 
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In sum, the political culture account identifies distinctive clusters of 
attitudes that are widely held across individuals. These durable clusters 
form subjective world orientations that are highly resistant to change, and 
are seen as the fundamental generator of economic and political perfor- 
mance.4 They are, in this sense, more crucial than objective conditions em- 
bodied in institutions, and they endure in the face of institutional change. 
Note the policy implications of this claim. As Moore (1966), Portes 
(1976) and others have noted, the argument allows for slow change at most, 
since it casts subjective orientations a more important than, and largely 
independent of, objective conditions. Ifregional differences incivic-mind- 
edness across contemporary Italy date back to the Middle Ages, meaningful 
change in the future is unlikely. Poor economic and political performance 
stem from cultural pathologies that, in the words of another scholar, are 
"self-generating i  the double sense that socialization perpetuates both the 
cultural patterns of the group and consequent individual psycho-social inad- 
equacies blocking escape from [them]" (Valentine 1968, 141). 
Putnam and Inglehart marshall considerable data from two distinctive 
but complementary settings in support of the cultural perspective. As we 
show below, however, this evidence is not as persuasive as it might first 
appear. We begin by reconsidering the evidence offered in Putnam's analy- 
sis of regional governance in Italy, and then turn our attention toInglehart' s 
study of differences incivic culture across the industrial democracies as a 
whole. 
Civic Virtue in Italy 
Putnam's purpose is to account for the variance in the performance of
political institutions across Italy's 20 regions. These regions vary signifi- 
cantly in terms of wealth, social structure, and, according to Putnam, in 
terms of political culture. This setting is of special interest because the 
creation of new regional governments in the 1 970s provided an opportunity 
to conduct what Putnam calls a "unique experiment" that assesses the 
effect of political culture on institutional performance. The study itself is 
based on an extensive data set concerning a wide variety of social, eco- 
nomic and political attributes ofeach region. While the bulk of this informa- 
tion refers to the contemporary period, Putnam also includes quantitative 
material dating back to the last part of the nineteenth century. 
Putnam contends that regional variations in political culture outperform 
4At various points in his concluding chapter, Putnam labels these subjective orientations 
as "social capital," by which he means those "features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency ofsociety by facilitating coordinated 
actions" (1993, 167). 
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economic development in explaining Italian regional government perfor- 
mance since the 1970s. Apparent support for this conclusion comes from 
a regression of institutional performance on current political culture and 
level of economic development. The estimates we obtain (using Putnam's 
data) are: 
Performance = 0.00 + 1.20 (CCV) - 0.32 (ED) 
(5.7) (1.5) 
[1] 
R2= .86, N = 20, 
where Performance is Putnam's measure of institutional performance, c. 
1970, CCV and ED are his measures of current civic culture and economic 
development, respectively, and t-ratios are reported in parentheses. When 
data for earlier cultural traditions are substituted for current patterns, the 
estimates are: 
Performance = -0.04 + 1.16 (ECV) - 0.19 (ED) 
(2.9) (0.5) 
[2] 
R2 = .74, N = 17, 
where ECV is Putnam's measure of earlier civic values from the turn of 
the century, and other terms are defined as in [1]. Estimates like these would 
seem to suggest hat while the effects of earlier civic traditions are weaker 
than those of current civic culture, both outperform economic development 
in the explanation of institutional performance. 
Putnam's tatistical nalysis of the effect of political culture on demo- 
cratic governance relies primarily on the three variables just identified: in- 
stitutional performance, civic community and (earlier) civic traditions. 
Each of these variables is a composite measure created by combining an 
assortment of indicators on the basis of a principal components analysis. 
As is well-known, this is a statistical procedure "that linearly transforms 
an original set of variables into a substantially smaller set of uncorrelated 
variables that represents most of the information i  the original set of vari- 
ables" (Dunteman 1989, 7, our emphasis. See also Flury 1988). 
Putnam extracts a single measure of each of the three variables men- 
tioned above from a variety of indicators. He proceeds by specifying in 
advance that no more than one component be extracted at each phase of 
the analysis. He thus simply assumes that each of the three variables is 
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unidimensional.5 The question, then, is whether the composite variables 
constructed by Putnam reflect most of the information contained in the 
composite indicators from which they are formed. 
Measuring Institutional Performance 
To construct his dependent variable, Putnam selects indicators based 
on four elements: policy process and internal operations, policy decision 
content, policy implementation, a d bureaucratic responsiveness (1993, 
66-73). In all, 33 indicators are used to reflect hese different elements. 
Putnam defends the large number of indicators on the grounds that "no 
single metric, taken in isolation, would suffice to rate the regions fairly. 
Collectively, however, these indicators can undergird a broad-based assess- 
ment of institutional performance" (1993, 66-7).6 
To avoid evaluating an underidentified model (since there are 33 vari- 
ables but only 20 cases), the analysis proceeds in steps. First, Putnam consid- 
ers 24 of the indicators, which e breaks down into three subsets. Three factors 
are generated from separate component analyses on each of these subsets, 
with the proviso that no more than one component be extracted in each of the 
three analyses. Along with the remaining nine indicators, these three factors 
are then subjected to an additional component analysis, in which a one-com- 
ponent solution is again specified in advance (Putnam 1993, 75, Table 3.2). 
Scores from this final component analysis are used to form the composite 
measure of performance in all of Putnam' s subsequent analyses. 
Table 1 reports the estimates we obtain from two different principal 
components analyses. The left margin lists the variables analyzed by the 
four domains of performance suggested by Putnam: policy process, policy 
decision content, policy implementation, a d bureaucratic responsiveness. 
The estimates displayed in the first column of the table are generated by 
assuming a unidimensional solution, and correspond closely to those re- 
ported by Putnam (1993, 75). Specifically, eight of the 12 indicators have 
5Given this prior specification, it is obvious that Putnam's component analyses cannot 
then be used as a test of the dimensionality of these variables. Besides, principal components 
can generate a unidimensional outcome ven when the variables are known to form more 
than one dimension (Armstrong 1967). 
6The meaning of a "fair" rating of the regions is unclear. If the broad range of indica- 
tors is chosen to minimize reliability problems, there is little reason to suspect such problems 
given the aggregated nature of the data. If, on the other hand, the collection of indicators 
is chosen to minimize concerns about measurement validity, the procedure isnot very help- 
ful, for the reasons we detail below. 
7The components inTable I are extracted from a correlation matrix like that reported 
by Putnam (1993, 199). Note that his is a pairwise correlation matrix; all of the correlations 
are based on the full 20 cases except for those involving Legislative innovation (variable 
#5), for which data are missing for five cases. We explored two other sets of estimates. First, 
we imputed values for the missing cases from the remaining 11 variables. Second, we re- 
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Table 1. Principal Component Analyses of Indicators of the 
Institutional Performance of Italian Regional Governments 
(N = 20; Italicized loadings > .60) 
Four-factor solution 
(rotated Varimax loadings) 
Single-factor 
Indicator solution I II III IV 
Policy process 
1. Cabinet stability .67 .32 .77 -.05 .07 
2. Budget promptness .57 -.03 .65 .19 .69 
3. Statistical services .79 .65 .21 .19 .45 
Policy decision content 
4. Reform legislation .87 .74 .42 .12 .22 
5. Legislative innovation .87 .72 .28 .16 .44 
Policy implementation 
6. Day care centers .86 .92 .26 -.06 .04 
7. Family clinics .63 .82 -.02 .05 .00 
8. Industrial policy .59 .27 .07 -.10 .91 
9. Agricultural spending .47 .41 .41 -.65 -.01 
10. Health spending .50 .33 .37 .76 .02 
11. Housing development .83 .80 .22 -.31 .28 
Bureaucratic responsiveness 
12. Responsiveness .61 .15 .85 .06 .17 
Eigenvalue 5.95 5.95 1.61 1.12 1.03 
Proportion of variance .496 .496 .135 .093 .086 
Cumulative prop. of variance .496 .496 .631 .724 .810 
loadings greater than .60 and the extracted component reproduces half of 
the variance in the 12 indicators. Masked by these numbers, however, is 
the existence of three additional components with eigenvalues greater than 
1.0. 
As the estimates in the remaining columns of the table show, Putnam' s 
single-factor solution does not constitute a reasonable representation f 
most of the information contained in the 12 indicators. When we abandon 
the single-factor restriction i favor of the customary eigenvalue cutoff of 
1.0 (Kim and Mueller 1978, 43), the figures suggest hat afour-factor solu- 
moved Legislative innovation from the analysis and performed principal components on the 
remaining 11 indicators. Apart from the obvious fact that the second procedure generates 
no loadings for the omitted variable, these alternative ways of handling the missing data 
yield very similar estimated factor loadings to those displayed in Table 1. 
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Table 2. Correlations (absolute value) among and Principal 
Components Analysis of Indicators of the Bureaucratic 
Responsiveness of Italian Regional Governments 
(N = 20; Italicized loadings > .60) 
Correlations Components 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. I II III 
1. Agriculture satisfaction .14 .09 .98 
2. Health satisfaction 0.14 -.93 .03 .01 
3. Vocational satisfaction 0.08 0.15 - -.05 -.92 -.08 
4. Agriculture l tter eply 0.64 0.34 0.16 - .02 .12 -.81 
5. Health letter eply 0.04 0.76 0.14 0.42 .95 .01 .02 
6. Vocational etter eply 0.08 0.03 0.71 0.33 0.05 - -.09 .93 -.06 
tion is optimal.8 Jointly, these four components reproduce over 80% of the 
variance in the 12 indicators, a clear improvement in fit.9 
A less obvious issue obscured in Table 1 concerns the use of compos- 
ites generated by an initial principal components analysis as indicators in 
subsequent component analyses. Take the case of bureaucratic respon- 
siveness, the last of the 12 indicators in Table 1, which was itself formed 
from a prior component analysis of six indicators. The first panel of Table 
2 displays the correlations among these six indicators. These correlations 
point to three distinct clusters: agricultural satisfaction/agricultural letter 
reply; health satisfaction/health letter reply; and vocational satisfaction/ 
vocational letter reply. 
A principal components analysis of the same six measures is reported 
in the second panel of Table 2. These estimates identify the same three 
distinct components that were suggested by the simple correlations. Each 
of these three components reflects, moreover, a distinctive policy area (agri- 
culture, health, and vocation, respectively) and each is therefore readily 
understood. To force a single-component solution, as does Putnam, is to 
generate an uninterpretable composite. The problem is simply compounded 
8The factor loadings hown in Table 1 from the four-factor estimates are from a varimax 
rotation. Estimates from oblique rotations are very similar, suggesting that the four factors 
are reasonably treated as orthogonal. 
9While the first factor emains the largest, only half of the indicators load unambigu- 
ously on it. Furthermore, the four factors are not clearly interpretable. In particular, they do 
not correspond with Putnam's original four-fold classification fthe 12 items (policy process, 
policy decision content, policy implementation, a dbureaucratic responsiveness). The esti- 
mates in Table 1 thus show that the 12 indicators cannot be used to generate a coherent, 
unidimensional measure of institutional performance. 
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when that composite is subsequently combined with 11 other indicators to 
form one overall summary measure of "institutional performance." 10 
Measuring Civic Culture 
Applying parallel analyses to the four indicators of current civic com- 
munity (preference voting, referendum turnout, newspaper eadership, and 
the frequency of sports and cultural associations), we find a pattern more 
consistent with Putnam's argument. Specifically, our estimates of an un- 
restricted principal component model show that he first component has an 
eigenvalue much greater than the cutoff of 1.0, and reproduces 85% of the 
variance in the four indicators. In contrast, he second factor has an eigen- 
value of only .28. Although the figures are a little less clear-cut, a one- 
factor solution also fits reasonably well with the five indicators of early 
civic traditions: strength of mass parties, incidence of cooperatives, mem- 
bership in mutual aid societies, electoral turnout, and the longevity of local 
associations. Our estimates of an unrestricted model indicate that the first 
factor eproduces 74% of the variance in the five indicators, while the eigen- 
value for the second factor is .78. 
In themselves, of course, the above patterns do not imply that he two 
components extracted reflect either current civic community orearlier civic 
traditions." Such questions of interpretability aside, these patterns do indi- 
"0A similar problem occurs with the construction f the component "housing and urban 
development." Within this composite we identified two distinct but correlated factors (r = 
.41). Using oblique rotation, the factors and their loadings are: 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
1. Subsidized spending capacity, 1987 .06 .94 
2. Facilitated spending capacity, 1987 -.92 -.08 
3. Subsidized spending capacity, 1981 -.38 .67 
4. Housing spending capacity (A), 1985 -.10 .86 
5. Housing spending capacity (B), 1985 -.92 -.07 
6. Urban development spending capacity, 1979 -.38 .73 
See Putnam (1993, 72-3) for adiscussion of the measures of housing and urban development. 
"For example, while both measures include voter turnout as components, the connec- 
tion between turnout and civic culture is quite unclear. Other studies have shown that voter 
turnout in general is more a function of institutional than cultural differences (Powell 1986; 
Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995), and there is no a priori reason to believe that 
turnout in Italy (either in elections during the earlier period or in referenda uring the later 
period) should be different. Indeed, there is evidence from Putnam's data that turnout in 
Italian referenda uring the 1970s and 1980s varied with the number of propositions tobe 
decided, consistent with an institutional voter fatigue hypothesis (Jackman and Miller 1995, 
482-3). Specifically, a pooled analysis of the five referenda from 1974 to 1987 across all 
20 regions yields a regression coefficient of-2.7 for the number of items per referendum, 
suggesting that urnout dropped by just under 3% for each proposition added to a referendum 
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cate that there is at least a statistical rationale for the single-component 
solution employed by Putnam in the construction fhis explanatory vari- 
ables. The empirical difficulty with Putnam's analysis thus appears to hinge 
on his dependent variable. 
Reassessing the Link Between Culture and Performance 
We now turn from the internal structure ofPutnam's measures to con- 
sider the linkages between them. As indicated above, Putnam reports strong 
relationships between his composite of institutional performance and his 
composites of political culture (both current civic values and early civic 
traditions). Ifthese estimates are robust, we should obtain similar elation- 
ships between civic culture and institutional performance when we focus 
on the constituent parts of each. If, however, the composite measures lack 
coherence, such a disaggregation will generate a much more mixed set of 
estimates.12 To gauge the sensitivity ofthe estimates to the particular indica- 
tors chosen, we regress each individual indicator of institutional perfor- 
mance on current civic values and early civic culture, controlling for eco- 
nomic development. Table 3 summarizes the regression results by reporting 
the estimated t-ratios (absolute values). 
The first row of Table 3 shows the t-ratios from the regressions of the 
composite measure of institutional performance onthe composite measures 
of current civic community and early civic traditions, respectively, control- 
ling for economic development ( hese t-ratios correspond to those reported 
in Equations [1] and [2] above).13 The t-ratios for civic community and 
civic traditions in this top row are quite large (5.7 and 2.9, respectively), 
while those for economic development are much smaller (less than 2.0). 
Calculations like these form the basis for Putnam's conclusions, as we 
noted earlier. 
A considerably more mixed picture merges from the t-ratios for the 
individual components of institutional performance displayed in successive 
(information the number of propositions is from Butler and Ranney 1994, Appendix A, 
and the maximum proposition/referendum ratio was 5 in the period). 
"2Our analyses follow the logic of construct validation (e.g., Zeller and Carmines 1980). 
Thus, we are concerned with evaluating (a) the coherence of the composite measures of 
cultural values and institutional performance taken separately and (b) the linkages between 
the indicators of cultural values and the indicators of institutional performance. 
3We report the absolute value of the t-ratios simply to summarize the various regression 
analyses. With 17 degrees of freedom, a t-ratio f 2.11 or greater is significant a  or beyond 
the .05 level, and a t-ratio of 1.74 is significant at or beyond the .10 level. Following conven- 
tion, we use 2.0 as an approximate cutoff point for statistical significance. As will become 
clear in Table 3, the majority of the estimated coefficients have t-ratios considerably ess than 
2.0, which means that he signs of most of the regression coefficients and related estimates not 
reported in the tables are quite unreliable. 
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Table 3. T-ratios from Regressions of Institutional Performance and 
its Components on Civic Values and Economic Development 
(Italian Regional Data, N = 20) 
Current culture* Early culture** 
Dependent Variable CCV ED ECV ED 
Overall Institutional Performance 5.7 1.5 2.9 0.5 
Policy Process 
Cabinet stability 3.2 1.9 1.5 0.8 
Budget promptness 1.2 0.0 0.7 1.3 
Statistical services 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.7 
Policy Decision Content 
Reform legislation 2.4 0.0 2.8 0.7 
Legislative innovation 0.9 0.6 1.6 0.3 
Policy Implementation 
Day care centers 2.6 0.7 4.0 1.5 
Family clinics 1.4 0.5 1.4 0.4 
Industrial policy 1.9 0.7 0.8 1.7 
Agricultural spending 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.0 
Local health spending 3.0 1.7 2.3 1.3 
Housing development 2.5 0.8 1.9 0.2 
Bureaucratic Responsiveness 
Responsiveness 2.7 1.7 3.8 3.1 
*Absolute t-ratios from regressions on current civic values (CCV) and current economic 
development (ED). 
**Absolute t-ratios from regressions on early civic values (ECV) and current economic 
development (ED). 
rows of Table 3. Of the 12 regressions in the first part of the table for 
current culture (with economic development controlled), only six have t- 
ratios for civic community exceeding 2.0. Two of these significant t-ratios, 
moreover, are for "housing development" and "bureaucratic respon- 
siveness," both of which are composite measures that are difficult to inter- 
pret for the reasons we have already given. The results for the correspond- 
ing regressions in the second part of the table involving early cultural 
traditions are even less encouraging. Of these 12 regressions, only four (or 
one-third) have t-ratios greater than 2.0. 
The robustness of Putnam's conclusions is further obscured when we 
substitute the component indicators of culture (referenda turnout, prefer- 
ence voting, news associations, and sports associations) for the overall com- 
posites employed as explanatory variables in Table 3 (results not dis- 
played). With the composite measure of institutional performance as the 
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dependent variable, the results are relatively consistent, with three of the 
four t-ratios for the components of civic community in the top row larger 
than 2.0. This apparent consistency fades, however, when we substitute 
the 12 separate components of institutional performance for the composite 
dependent variable. 
Of the distinct indicators of civic culture, referenda turnout has the 
most consistent effects on the different components of institutional perfor- 
mance, but even here, only seven of 12 estimated coefficients (58%) have 
t-ratios of at least 2.0. For the preference voting coefficients, the number 
of t-ratios greater than or equal to 2.0 drops to five of 12 (42%). Only two 
of the 12 coefficients (17%) for sports associations are significant, and none 
of the newspaper-readership coefficients meet conventional evels of sta- 
tistical significance. Indeed, of the 48 possible estimates, only 14 (or less 
than 30%) have statistically significant coefficients on an indicator of civic 
community, and five of these are for housing development or bureaucratic 
responsiveness, measures whose meaning is ambiguous, as we argued ear- 
lier. That so few of the coefficients for associations and newspaper reader- 
ship reflect a systematic effect is of particular interest given the centrality 
of association membership and the mass media in most accounts of civic 
vitality; indeed, Putnam approvingly quotes de Tocqueville on the point 
(1993, 92). 
This extreme sensitivity of the estimated coefficients for culture to the 
particular component indicators under consideration undermines the cul- 
tural argument. The only civic community indicator that systematically af- 
fects institutional performance in at least a majority of the tests (seven of 
12) is referenda turnout. Whether this has any implications for a political 
culture interpretation is unclear, for the reasons advanced earlier. 
The case for a cultural explanation is even weaker when the composite 
measure of early cultural traditions is decomposed into its five constituent 
parts. Again, we do not display the estimates here, but the effects are mini- 
mal even if we restrict our attention to Putnam's overall measure of institu- 
tional performance. None of the five separate elements of early civic tradi- 
tions (the strength of mass-based parties, the incidence of cooperatives, 
membership in mutual-aid societies, electoral turnout, and the incidence of 
local associations) has a t-ratio of at least 2.0 (although two of them are 
very close at 1.9). The estimates are still more erratic when the dependent 
variable is further disaggregated. 
In all, we find very little indication from the Italian data to suggest that 
institutional performance depends in any appreciable manner on cultural 
traditions. While there is a statistical justification for the measures of civic 
community developed by Putnam, those measures do not address distribu- 
tions of cultural values directly. More troubling is the fact that the measure 
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of institutional performance cannot be justified even on statistical grounds. 
As a result, these data provide no warrant for linking cultural values to 
political performance. 
Civic Virtue in the Industrial Democracies 
We now turn to a different setting for a further mpirical evaluation 
of the cultural rgument. This centers on the analyses reported by Inglehart 
(1990), who examines broader cross-national variations across the indus- 
trial democracies, and whose analyses focus on different forms of perfor- 
mance. In addition, Inglehart's measures of civic culture are primarily 
based on survey data that more directly reflect potential differences inmass 
civic orientations.14 We first examine Inglehart's measures of political cul- 
ture, and assess the linkages between these measures and other factors in 
order to evaluate their construct validity. 
Measuring Political Culture 
Following Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart identifies the following 
seven specific indicators of mass political culture: 
1. Levels of overall ife satisfaction, 
2. Levels of interpersonal trust, 
3. Support for revolutionary change, 
4. Support for the current social order, 
5. Levels of political discussion, 
6. Levels of postmaterialist values, 
7. Proportion of the population Protestant. 
Measures of the first six indicators of political culture are from Inglehart 
(1990, chap. I), and refer to the early 1980s. Further details on these mea- 
sures are provided in the Appendix. Data on the last indicator, percentage 
Protestant c. 1965, are from Taylor and Hudson (1972).'5 
We have already emphasized the consistent claim in cultural accounts 
that indicators like these form a coherent cluster. Thus, Inglehart describes 
the first five of these items as constituting "a syndrome of positive attitudes 
toward the world in which one lives (1990, 41). Similarly, postmaterialists 
are said to place special weight on quality of life issues and on the sense 
of community, both of which involve the altruism, cooperative spirit, and 
4To be sure, Putnam (1993, 109-18) does briefly compare scattered survey data on 
levels of powerlessness, trust, and satisfaction with life with his measure of current civic 
community, but his analyses do not rely primarily on these opinion data. 
"Given its distribution, the variable used in Table 4 is the natural logarithm of the 
percentage Protestant (plus 1). 
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Table 4. Product-moment Correlations among Seven Components of 
Political Culture, circa 1980 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Satisfaction 22 18 18 21 20 24 
2. Trust .55 18 18 19 18 22 
3. % Revolutionary -.57 -.52 18 17 15 18 
4. % Conservative .36 .43 -.40 17 15 18 
5. % Materialist -.66 -.43 .41 -.36 18 21 
6. % Women discussing .62 .45 -.45 .55 -.61 20 
7. % Protestant .76 .61 -.24 .48 -.68 .76 
Sources: Data on the first six indicators are from Inglehart (1990, chap. 1); information 
Protestantism is the natural logarithm of the percentage Protestant scores from Taylor and 
Hudson (1972). 
Entries below the main diagonal are pair-wise correlation coefficients, and entries above the 
main diagonal indicate the number of cases for which those correlations are calculated. 
general civic-mindedness typically associated with civic virtue. Finally, 
Protestantism is also described as part of this syndrome (1990, 50). 
Is there evidence that these measures of political culture form an under- 
lying coherent cluster of attitudes, as claimed by Inglehart? Table 4 displays 
the correlations among the seven indicators of political culture. Because 
some of these indicators are available for more countries than others, we 
report pair-wise correlation coefficients below the main diagonal, and indi- 
cate the number of cases over which the correlations are calculated above 
the main diagonal."6 Given the coding of the variables, the signs of the 
coefficients are all as expected. Yet the most striking feature of these corre- 
lations is their comparatively modest size, given that they are calculated 
for national aggregates. Ignoring signs, the 21 correlations in the table range 
from .24 to .76, with a mean value of .52. Only two (approximately 10%) 
exceed .70, which translates into an R2 of .50. This means that only in these 
two pairings of indicators is more than half the variance shared. Across the 
remaining 19 pairings, the shared variances are considerably smaller. The 
modest size of most of the correlations in Table 4 challenges the assertion 
that these indicators are all components of a single enduring and distinctive 
cluster of cultural traits. 
"6Despite his claim that these variables form a coherent cluster, Inglehart does not 
himself report a correlation matrix (or factor analysis) that includes all the variables hown 
in Table 6. A factor analysis of these variables eems unwise in view of (a) the lack of 
structure inthe correlations inTable 6 and (b) the variation across the items in the incidence 
of missing data that is evident above the main diagonal. 
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Sources of Political Culture 
An alternative way of gauging whether these indicators form a well- 
defined configuration is to see if they are generated by the same underlying 
economic conditions. Civic virtue should be more widespread within the 
wealthier democracies, all else equal, for the reasons advanced by Inglehart 
(among other things, national wealth takes time to accumulate and is there- 
fore a long-term condition that changes comparatively slowly). By the same 
token, civic virtue should be less sensitive to shorter-term economic condi- 
tions (e.g., economic growth in the recent past) or economic conditions that 
are more prone to temporal fluctuation (e.g., levels of unemployment). The 
claim that the indicators form a coherent cultural cluster necessarily im- 
plies, moreover, that they should each respond in a similar manner to the 
same economic conditions. 
Table 5 reports the estimates from regressions of the indicators of polit- 
ical culture on economic conditions. These estimates involve separate re- 
gressions of the first six components from Table 4 (all of which entail val- 
ues measured in 1980 or very shortly thereafter), but exclude the measure 
of Protestantism, which is for c. 1965. The six elements are regressed on 
(a) national wealth, as indexed by the logarithm of real GDP per capita for 
1980, (b) economic growth over the previous decade, as measured by 
growth in real GDP per capita (1970-80), and (c) the level of unemploy- 
ment for 1980.17 The cultural argument, of course, implies that the explana- 
tory variables in Table 5 should have similar effects on each of the six 
component indicators. 
From the first row of the table, we see that national differences in levels 
of life satisfaction are sensitive to the level of economic development and 
economic growth over the prior decade, but do not vary with levels of 
unemployment. Specifically, levels of satisfaction are higher in wealthier 
countries and in those that experienced lower growth rates over the previous 
10 years. This pattern is repeated in the estimates for the percentage materi- 
alist. The sign reversals here merely reflect the coding of the dependent 
variable (percentage materialist minus percentage postmaterialist), so the 
coefficients in the fifth row show that postmaterialism increases with level 
of development and decreases with prior growth. In contrast, when we turn 
to levels of interpersonal trust in the second row of the table, only the 
coefficient for unemployment is statistically significant. Distrust seems to 
increase with unemployment, but is insensitive to either the level of devel- 
opment or growth in the recent past. A similar pattern is obtained with the 
percentage of women discussing politics in the bottom row of the table (the 
"7Data for levels and growth of real GDP are from Summers and Heston (1991); those 
for levels of unemployment arefrom OECD (1991). 
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Table 5. Regressions of Components of Political Culture, circa 1980, 




Dependent Variable 1980 1970-80 Unemployment Constant R2 N 
Satisfaction 1.19* -2.96* -.02 -2.76 .60 20 
(2.6) (2.2) (0.5) (0.6) 
Trust 0.73 -28.91 -2.46* 56.65 .37 18 
(0.1) (1.1) (2.6) (0.7) 
% Revolutionary -3.93* 10.20 0.52* 35.94 .58 16 
(2.0) (1.5) (2.2) (1.8) 
% Conservative 10.80 25.53 -1.84* -71.53 .55 16 
(1.8) (1.2) (2.5) (1.2) 
% Materialist -19.16* 57.98* 0.29 181.33* .64 19 
(2.6) (2.6) (0.4) (2.5) 
% Women discussing 11.94 -41.41 -1.88 -30.42 .46 18 
(1.2) (1.2) (1.9) (0.3) 
Sources: For the dependent variables, see Table 1. GDP data are from Summers and Heston 
(1991) and unemployment data are from OECD (1991). 
* Starred coefficients are more than twice their standard errors. 
coefficient for which has a t-ratio f 1.9), suggesting that political interest 
declines with increasing unemployment. Finally, the two items on support 
for the existing social order behave in a parallel manner (reflecting in part 
the fact that they are based on different responses to the same question). 
Support for the current order is higher in wealthier countries and in those 
with lower unemployment, but does not vary with recent growth."8 
Overall, the patterns apparent in Table 5 reinforce the inferences we 
drew from Table 4. The six "components" of political culture do not form 
a coherent general structure: instead, they are sensitive to different factors. 
Even the first hree components in the table do not cluster together, despite 
Inglehart's use of these three as a summary measure of political culture in 
his Figure 1.6 (1990, 44). The similarities that are evident in Table 5 are 
not clearly interpretable, moreover: why, for example, should life satisfac- 
tion and materialism respond differently to economic conditions than do 
levels of trust and the percentage of women who discuss politics? Finally, 
insofar as growth in the recent past and levels of unemployment reflect 
'8The same patterns a those reported inTable 5 are obtained if the measure of economic 
growth is taken to cover an even shorter period (1975-80) that focuses on economic perfor- 
mance after the oil shock of 1974. 
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shorter-term economic patterns, the fact that these two variables influence 
some but not all of the components is incompatible with the interpretation 
that the latter represent enduring cultural values.19 
Effects of Political Culture 
The question that remains is whether any or all of these cultural indica- 
tors influence other outcomes. Inglehart's claim that they do echoes the 
earlier suggestion (Almond and Verba 1963) that civic virtue is essential for 
a successful democracy, and anticipates Putnam's (1993) parallel linkage 
between civic virtue and effective governance. Inglehart goes on to suggest 
that civic virtue also impinges on economic growth. We briefly discuss 
these issues in turn. 
Inglehart's conclusion that culture influences the success of democracy 
depends on two pieces of evidence. First, he reports a correlation of .85 
between life satisfaction and democracy (1990, 42). Second, he claims that 
the effects of economic development on democracy are mediated by the 
proportion of the labor force in the tertiary sector and by "civic culture" 
(as reflected in levels of life satisfaction and interpersonal trust, and support 
for revolutionary change). The meaning one attaches to these associations 
hinges decisively, however, on how one identifies "successful democra- 
cies." 
The particular measure used by Inglehart is a count of the years of 
continuous democracy from 1900 through 1986. The measure and the re- 
search design within which it is employed, however, contain several anom- 
alies. First, as one would correctly expect given the title of his book, the 
countries analyzed by Inglehart consist almost exclusively of the advanced 
industrial societies (the notable exceptions in his Figure 1.5 are Argentina, 
Hungary, and South Africa [Inglehart 1990,42]). Their levels of democratic 
performance as of the early to middle 1980s were, as a result, all roughly 
equivalent (see Bollen 1993). Under this procedure, however, Belgium, 
"Clarke and Dutt (1991) found a similar problem. The results from their pooled cross- 
sectional time series analysis of eight countries over the period 1976-86 indicate "that sharp 
increases in unemployment i  he early 1980s make it appear, based on the four-item ea- 
sure, that there was a substantial shift oward postmaterialism in several countries." They 
conclude that he upward trend stemmed more from "the failure to include an unemployment 
statement inthe measure" than from changes in underlying values (1991, 918). In another 
pooled analysis of some of these items from eight countries, Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 
(1993) provide further vidence of the sensitivity ofthese items to short-run economic and 
political circumstances including inflation, unemployment, fluctuations i  support for politi- 
cal parties, and rally-around-the-flag events. Duch and Taylor (1993) reach the parallel con- 
clusion that apparent shifts in postmaterialism tem disproportionately from the inclusion 
of an inflation item in the index. All of these analyses underscore the sensitivity ofInglehart's 
measures to short-run rather than long-term economic onditions. 
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which is coded as continuously democratic since 1900, is measured as being 
three times more democratic than France, whose democratic history is 
coded as beginning in 1958. The judgment that Belgium really was approxi- 
mately three times more democratic than France by 1980 is untenable, 
given any reasonable set of criteria for democratic performance. 
Second, Inglehart's use of 1900 as the starting date ignores the fact 
that he meaning of democracy has evolved considerably over this century, 
especially in terms of what Dahl (1971) has labelled inclusiveness. When 
one recalls the typical restrictions onthe suffrage based on gender, income, 
and race 90 years ago, the implications of this evolution become self-evi- 
dent: since 1900, none of the countries o coded by Inglehart has been 
continuously democratic in a contemporary sense. This problem under- 
mines all attempts o identify a binary starting date after which a country 
can be considered emocratic and before which it cannot. 
Third, Inglehart's analysis does not help account for levels of demo- 
cratic performance b cause his research design selects cases according to 
their (high) values on that dependent variable (see Geddes 1990). Variations 
in political culture (or any other potential explanatory variable) cannot logi- 
cally be used to account for fundamentally uniform degrees of political 
democracy. That Inglehart's measure includes more variance does not obvi- 
ate the problem. It simply means that his measure inadvertently conflates 
democracy with at least one other variable-political stability (Bollen and 
Jackman 1989).2o 
Given the above, the associations reported by Inglehart should most 
plausibly be taken to reflect covariation between culture and stability, not 
between culture and democratic performance. They therefore do not ad- 
dress the issues that have motivated scholars, at least since Almond and 
Verba, concerning the impact of democratic (i.e., civic) values on demo- 
cratic performance. Further, these associations cannot logically sustain the 
causal argument a stake, because that argument implies that he distribution 
of values identified insurveys administered inthe early 1980s gave rise to 
the stability of constitutional orders over the preceding 85 years. 
20Duch and Taylor point o a related problem: "recent survey evidence from the Soviet 
Union and Eastern and Central Europe suggests the mass public embraces postmaterialist 
values in spite of the serious economic penury they have endured" (1993, 753). Inglehart 
explains this apparent anomaly as follows: "the crucial factor is security during one's forma- 
tive years, and it is clear that he communist regimes of Eastern Europe provided a relatively 
secure xistence .. ." (Inglehart 1992, 14, quoted in Duch and Taylor 1993, 753). In making 
this argument Inglehart confounds economic security and economic development. The result 
is an unfalsifiable argument: "economic security drives postmaterialism, butif we see high 
levels of postmaterialism and low economic development a the same time, then factors 
other than economic wealth have promoted economic security" (Duch and Taylor 1993, 
753). 
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If the claim for an effect on democracy is weak, so too is the assertion 
that civic virtue influences economic growth. To be sure, Inglehart does 
label his discussion as "speculation with data" (1990, 40). On the other 
hand, his appraisal concludes with the following: 
Economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables.... The avail- 
able evidence supports Weber's insight hat culture is not just a consequence 
of economics; it can shape the basic nature of economic and political ife 
(Inglehart 1990, 65). 
As evidence, Inglehart compares the modest correlation between the level 
of economic development and economic growth rates (r = -.22), with the 
"far stronger" relationship between postmaterialism and economic growth 
during the period 1965-84 (r = -.54). Thus, while a nation's wealth can 
affect he rate at which its economy grows, Inglehart maintains that it does 
so ". . . only insofar as it brings cultural change" (1990, 64). In this vein, 
Evidence from a cross-national perspective converges with evidence from the 
individual level, pointing to a long-term cultural process of negative feedback 
linked with economic growth.... The wealthier societies are least likely to 
produce Materialist publics, but Materialist publics eem to produce high eco- 
nomic growth rates.... Since one's values tend to reflect he conditions pre- 
vailing during one's preadult years, we allow a lag of about thirty ears be- 
tween [level of economic development and mass value priorities]... (Inglehart 
1990, 57). 
To substantiate these claims, Inglehart reports a correlation of r = -.59 be- 
tween a nation's per capita GNP in 1950 and the percentage of the national 
population holding Materialist values, c. 1980 (1990, 57).2' This argument 
implies that the configuration of mass value priorities prevailing in the early 
1980s should be systematically related to economic growth rates in thefollow- 
ing period. We therefore stimate separate regressions of 1980-88 RGDP 
per capita growth rates on each of Inglehart' smeasures of cultural values for 
c. 1980, controlling for 1980 RGDP per capita (see Table 6). 
The analysis in Table 6 indicates that the relationship between culture 
and economic growth rates is weak to nonexistent. Out of seven separate 
regressions, not one coefficient estimate for mass value priorities is statisti- 
cally significant. On the other hand, the estimate for the level of national 
2 Inglehart's discussion of changes in the signs of the coefficients oneconomic growth 
that occur when different periods are investigated is somewhat puzzling. The issues at stake 
here are part of an ongoing controversy about whether industrial economies are converging 
(e.g., De Long 1988; Baumol and Wolf 1988; and Maddison 1991). 
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Table 6. Regressions of Current Growth Rates (1980-88) on 
Different Cultural Values Controlling for 1980 GDP 
[coefficients (t-ratios)] 
Measure of Culture Per capita 
Political Culture c. 1980 GDP 1980 Constant R2 N 
Satisfaction -0.04 0. 19* -1.3 1* .42 24 
(1.3) (3.6) (3.5) 
Trust 0.00 0.12* -1.07* .45 22 
(1.5) (2.7) (2.8) 
% Revolutionary -0.01 0.06 -0.39 .38 18 
(1.3) (1 .0) (0.7) 
% Conservative 0.00 0.11* -0.91* .31 18 
(0.2) (2.3) (2.1) 
% Materialist 0.00 0.15* -1.28* .35 21 
(1.5) (3.0) (2.7) 
% Women discussing -0.00 0.06 -0.43 .12 20 
(0.4) (1.5) (1. 1) 
% Protestant -0.00 0.15* -1.21* .37 24 
(0.4) (3.3) (3.0) 
Sources: see Tables 6 and 7. 
*Starred coefficients are more than twice their standard errors. 
wealth is in the expected direction in all cases, and significant in all but 
two of the analyses.22 In sum, there is no systematic relationship between 
any indicator of culture and current economic growth rates. 
Taken together, the estimates presented in Tables 4 through 6 offer 
scant support for the arguments advanced by Inglehart. First, our analyses 
challenge his arguments regarding the existence of an enduring and distinc- 
tive cluster of cultural traits. Second, we find that Inglehart's measures of 
culture are sensitive to short-term fluctuations in economic growth rates 
and the level of unemployment. This sensitivity varies by indicator, more- 
over: levels of life satisfaction and postmaterialism are systematically af- 
fected by economic growth rates, but are relatively insensitive to levels of 
22To duplicate Inglehart's procedure more closely, we also performed bivariate regres- 
sions between his measures of culture and current economic growth rates. Out of seven 
regressions, we initially found two significant relationships. The estimates for Trust and 
percent Revolutionary were both statistically significant (p < .02). Inspection of the leverage 
plots revealed, however, that both relationships were dependent upon the distorting effects 
of influential points (Bollen and Jackman 1990). In the former, the values for South Africa 
and Argentina drove the relationship; while in the latter, the measure for South Africa was 
responsible for the distortion. With these cases removed, the p values increased to .30 and 
.42, respectively. 
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unemployment. On the other hand, the opposite pattern obtains for levels 
of trust and the percentage of women who discuss politics. Finally, our 
analyses challenge the claim that "culture" has any systematic effects on 
either political democracy or economic growth. 
Conclusions 
Our purpose has been to evaluate the general claims advanced in the 
two leading recent studies of political culture. Central to those analyses is 
the idea that political cultures stem from distinctive and coherent configu- 
rations of attitudes across broad groups of citizens. The available survey 
data reported by Inglehart (1990), however, do not warrant his conclusion. 
The correlations among the aggregate indicators of mass value priorities 
are relatively modest in size (on average, about .50), and therefore cannot 
be used as evidence of a coherent configuration of mass value priorities. 
Putnam's analyses (1993) do not directly address this issue: while the statis- 
tical evidence indicates that his indicators of civic culture can be used to 
generate a unidimensional measure, the meaning of the resulting measure 
is unclear, and this problem is compounded by the fact that the measure 
does not focus directly on clusters of attitudes. 
Second, we have found no evidence for durable cultural syndromes. 
This durability of culture is pivotal to both Putnam's and Inglehart's claims: 
cultural norms persist over the long term (measured occasionally in centu- 
ries by Putnam), and are only slightly modified in the short term. We pro- 
vide evidence that Inglehart's measures of political culture are influenced 
significantly by short-term factors (unemployment and economic growth). 
We find, moreover, that the degree of sensitivity to these short-term factors 
varies by indicator, with life satisfaction and postmaterialism significantly 
affected by economic growth over the previous decade, but relatively insen- 
sitive to levels of unemployment, and the opposite pattern occurring for 
the measures of trust and revolutionary sentiments. Putnam's data do not 
allow us to gauge the durability of cultural norms, because they do not 
reflect attitudinal configurations. 
Finally, we have found no evidence to suggest that cultural factors have 
any systematic effects on political and economic outcomes. In the Italian 
case, there are strong correlations between the overall measures of culture 
and "institutional performance" discussed by Putnam (1993). Our reexam- 
ination of the data suggests, however, that these are an artifact of Putnam's 
particular application of principal components analysis, not a reflection of 
any underlying causal relationship. Indeed, we find no evidence to suggest 
that the indicators examined by Putnam can be meaningfully combined into 
an overall measure of political performance. Separate regression analyses 
employing the individual component indicators of institutional performance 
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reveal that the vast majority of the coefficients are indistinguishable from 
zero, using conventional statistical criteria. 
Turning to differences across the industrial democracies, we find no 
systematic linkage between any of Inglehart's measures of culture and sub- 
sequent economic growth. Although a correlation does exist between the 
years of democratic experience and the configuration of mass value priori- 
ties, this association conflates democracy with stability. Inglehart's analysis 
suffers from selection bias, moreover, since almost all of the countries in 
his sample are highly democratic. These problems undermine any attempts 
to draw the causal inferences implied by the cultural account from the ob- 
served correlations between "culture" and "democracy." 
Would different research designs obviate some of these empirical dif- 
ficulties and generate more convincing support for a cultural approach? We 
think not, on two counts. First, Putnam's and Inglehart's studies are easily 
the most extensive empirical statements on behalf of political culture in 
recent years, and they are accounts that have received considerable acclaim. 
Besides, the results we have reported in this paper parallel the failure of 
other studies to link culture with rates of mass political participation (e.g., 
Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995), a pattern of partic- 
ular significance given that earlier studies of political culture (e.g., Almond 
and Verba 1963) were primarily concerned with advancing our knowledge 
of mass political behavior. We thus conclude that the general explanatory 
value of political culture is, at best, limited. 
Second, following Hirschman (1984), we have underscored the theoret- 
ical continuities linking the earlier studies with current studies of political 
culture, and noted the Weberian origins of both. The original studies of 
political culture, of course, drew heavily on anthropological analyses of 
culture of the 1950s and 1960s. It is important to understand, however, that 
the latter have more recently come under increasing criticism by anthropol- 
ogists for empirical inaccuracies, excessive cultural determinism, a roman- 
tic cultural relativism, and a fundamental tendency toward post hoc expla- 
nation (e.g., Spiro 1987, esp. chaps. 1, 2; Brown 1991; Billig 1994). 
Given the above, further attempts to refine and test the case for political 
culture along the lines we have addressed seem unlikely to be productive. 
We believe it may prove fruitful to recast the puzzle in more institutional 
terms, and in the process to endogenize political culture (again, adopting 
Hirschman's suggestion).23 We have already noted that institutional varia- 
23In this vein, an important recent analysis of the Sicilian Mafia identifies the weak- 
nesses of the common subcultural explanation of the phenomenon summarized by Putnam 
(1993, 146-8) and argues instead that distrust isendogenous, a characteristic hat is perpetu- 
ated and expanded by organized crime (Gambetta 1993). Trust, of course, is central to Put- 
nam's and Inglehart's treatment ofcivic virtue. 
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tions provide a parsimonious and powerful explanation of political partici- 
pation rates across the industrial democracies. Such an argument, of course, 
is not restricted to voter turnout rates, but can be elaborated to help account 
for political performance more generally. 
Distinctive to this approach are the propositions that institutions-po- 
litical, social, and economic-structure the distribution of incentives for 
individual action, and that individuals optimize in view of those constraints 
(Riker 1990, 172).24 Institutional change alters the opportunities available 
to political actors, and, even allowing for some stickiness, thereby modifies 
the behavior of those actors. In contrast o the cultural argument, which 
essentially takes incentive structures as given, this perspective directs our 
attention to the opportunity structures within which key political figures 
make strategic hoices (e.g., Geddes 1994; Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994; 
Jackman and Volpert 1996), and thus restores political considerations to a 
central analytic role. 
It could perhaps be countered that differences in institutional forms 
themselves imply reflect cultural variations. The problem then is that insti- 
tutions are divorced from their political origins. We think it more profitable 
to cast institutions as the result of conflict over the allocation of valued 
goods. Phrased differently, institutions reflect ". . . the efforts of some to 
constrain the actions of others with whom they interact" (Knight 1992, 
19). Institutions by this reckoning do not reveal cultural differences but are 
instead products of interdependent s rategies of groups to achieve distribu- 
tional gains (Shepsle 1989). As Knight points out, moreover, "to the extent 
that such rules can have substantive ffects on social outcomes, the substan- 
tive content of those rules should reflect the self-interest that motivates 
these claims and actions" (1992, 38). Institutions thus acquire stability 
when groups with the resources to alter the rules of the game accept those 
rules; institutional change occurs when group(s) with sufficient power are 
able to challenge and transform those rules. In this way, institutions condi- 
tion the distribution of both political and social resources. 
Manuscript submitted 3 February 1995. 
Final manuscript received 24 August 1995. 
24Occasionally, cultural values are cast in similar terms. For example, Greif treats them 
as the beliefs "that capture individual's expectations with respect o actions that others will 
take in various contingencies" (1994, 915). Note that his usage diverges ubstantially from 
that common in discussions of political culture, and deals with cultural values as a component 
of institutional arrangements. 
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APPENDIX 
Inglehart's Indicators of Political Culture 
1. Feelings of overall life satisfaction are generated from the following ques- 
tion: 
Generally speaking, how satisfied are your with your life as a whole? Would 
you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not 
at all satisfied? (Inglehart 1990, 25-6). 
The national evel of satisfaction is revealed by the proportion reporting "very 
satisfied" in the sample. As Inglehart observes, this is a very diffuse attitude that 
does not reflect political or economic performance ofthe moment, so that cross- 
national differences inthis orientation are "remarkably enduring" (1990, 25). 
2. Levels of "interpersonal trust" are identified from the following item: 
Now I would like to ask you about how much you would trust people from 
various countries. For each country, please say whether, inyour opinion, they 
are generally very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, notparticularly trustworthy, 
or not at all trustworthy (Inglehart 1990, 34). 
Levels of trust are measured by the percentage in each country identifying most 
people of their "own nationality" as very or fairly trustworthy. 
3. and 4. Evaluations of the current social order are manifested inresponses 
to the following item: 
[SHOW CARD] On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning 
the kind of society we live in. Please choose the one that best describes your 
own opinion: 
1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revo- 
lutionary action. 
2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 
3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive 
forces. 
Inglehart's third and fourth indicators of political culture (percent revolutionary 
and conservative, respectively) come from responses to options 1 and 3 on this 
item. 
5. Levels of political discussion are tapped by the following question: 
When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss 
political matters frequently, occasionally, or never? 
For the reasons advanced by Inglehart (1990, 50-2), we restrict our attention to 
the percentage of women reporting that they discuss politics either frequently or
occasionally. 
6. Materialist/postmaterialist v ues are inferred from items asking people to 
rank the following oals (Inglehart 1990, 74-5): 
A. Maintain order in the nation 
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B. Give people more say in the government 
C. Fight rising prices 
D. Protect freedom of speech 
E. Maintain a high rate of economic growth 
F. Make sure that this country has strong defense forces 
G. Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their com- 
munity 
H. Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful 
I. Maintain a stable economy 
J. Fight against crime 
K. Move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society 
L. Move toward a society where ideas count more than money 
(In some of his analyses Inglehart has relied on the first four items while on other 
occasions he has employed all 12. It is not clear which set is used in Inglehart 
[ 1988 or 1990, chap. 1]. Either way, note that items such as B, D, and G specifically 
emphasize democratic values. Note further the discussion of the meaning of these 
items by Clarke and Dutt [1991], and by Duch and Taylor [1993].) 
Postmaterialist values are said to stem from a decreasing emphasis on eco- 
nomic and physcial security accompanied by an increasing emphasis on nonmate- 
rial needs, "such as a sense of community and the quality of life" (Inglehart 1990, 
56). Following Inglehart, we focus on the percentage of the population expressing 
materialist values minus the percentage expressing nonmaterialist values. 
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